Colonia Ivu, San Salvador, El Salvador
Working Papers
"Political Costs of Staying and Migration Selection"
I develop a theory of local, political push factors for emigration. I argue that these push factors for emigration are based on perception and experience, and each operates differently in migration decision-making.
"Remittances and Preferences for Redistribution Through the Global Financial Crisis" (Revise & Resubmit)
.This paper asks two different but related questions: 1) Do remittance recipients support redistribution? and 2) Do preferences for redistribution change following a negative shock to remittances? Using three waves of survey data, I find that remittance recipients diverge from non-recipients in favoring redistribution following the global economic crisis. I test for possible mechanisms such as dependence on remittances and relative income levels to explain this change in preferences. I find that respondents who are more dependent on remittances are more likely to favor redistribution following the economic crisis.
"Remittances and Support for Military Coups" (Under Review)
This paper will examine the effect of remittances on support for coups in Latin America using data from the Americas Barometer (2006-2014). I find that remittance recipients are more likely to support a military coup than non-recipients. I argue that support for coups reflect the preference for stability over democracy in order to ensure continued consumption and investment from remittance income.
"Remittances, Regime Type, and Social Spending in the Developing World" with Lauren Duquette-Rury
How do migrant remittances influence patterns of national social spending and to what extent does their influence vary across different political regimes? Using an original panel data set containing migrant remittances and disaggregated data on social spending including education, health, and social protection, the authors find evidence that remittances produce different spending patterns conditional on regime type across the developing world. Findings suggest “hard” authoritarian regimes spend more on education, but less on health and social protections to finance corruption with increasing remittances, while intermediate political regimes behave more like democracies.
"Institutional Quality, Regime Type, and Emigration"
I argue that weak institutions and regime change produce political uncertainties, and that these uncertainties produce risk and costs. Citizens may opt to emigrate to insure against these risks. Using data on emigration by skill level, I find that weak governance is a major push factor for emigration for high-skilled labor. In the second exploratory analysis, I examine the role of political regime and regime change. I find that while democracies have less emigration than non-democracies, there is a brief rise in human capital flight following democratization.
"Democracy Diffused or Defused?: Migrant Exchanges, Political Attitudes, and the Honduran Coup of 2009"
Using survey data from the Americas Barometer, this paper examines the political attitudes of Honduran citizens before and after the political crisis of 2009, which resulted in the overthrow and expulsion of President Zelaya. I analyze whether Hondurans with family ties in the United States hold stronger democratic attitudes than the rest of the population, and if those attitudes persisted after the coup. There is evidence for the pro-democratic effects of migration prior to the coup. Surprisingly, I find that Hondurans with family ties to the United States are more tolerant of coups and pessimistic about democracy after the political crisis. The change in attitudes is largely driven by those who are financially dependent on remittances as opposed to those who hold frequent communication with relatives abroad.
"Political Costs of Staying and Migration Selection"
I develop a theory of local, political push factors for emigration. I argue that these push factors for emigration are based on perception and experience, and each operates differently in migration decision-making.
"Remittances and Preferences for Redistribution Through the Global Financial Crisis" (Revise & Resubmit)
.This paper asks two different but related questions: 1) Do remittance recipients support redistribution? and 2) Do preferences for redistribution change following a negative shock to remittances? Using three waves of survey data, I find that remittance recipients diverge from non-recipients in favoring redistribution following the global economic crisis. I test for possible mechanisms such as dependence on remittances and relative income levels to explain this change in preferences. I find that respondents who are more dependent on remittances are more likely to favor redistribution following the economic crisis.
"Remittances and Support for Military Coups" (Under Review)
This paper will examine the effect of remittances on support for coups in Latin America using data from the Americas Barometer (2006-2014). I find that remittance recipients are more likely to support a military coup than non-recipients. I argue that support for coups reflect the preference for stability over democracy in order to ensure continued consumption and investment from remittance income.
"Remittances, Regime Type, and Social Spending in the Developing World" with Lauren Duquette-Rury
How do migrant remittances influence patterns of national social spending and to what extent does their influence vary across different political regimes? Using an original panel data set containing migrant remittances and disaggregated data on social spending including education, health, and social protection, the authors find evidence that remittances produce different spending patterns conditional on regime type across the developing world. Findings suggest “hard” authoritarian regimes spend more on education, but less on health and social protections to finance corruption with increasing remittances, while intermediate political regimes behave more like democracies.
"Institutional Quality, Regime Type, and Emigration"
I argue that weak institutions and regime change produce political uncertainties, and that these uncertainties produce risk and costs. Citizens may opt to emigrate to insure against these risks. Using data on emigration by skill level, I find that weak governance is a major push factor for emigration for high-skilled labor. In the second exploratory analysis, I examine the role of political regime and regime change. I find that while democracies have less emigration than non-democracies, there is a brief rise in human capital flight following democratization.
"Democracy Diffused or Defused?: Migrant Exchanges, Political Attitudes, and the Honduran Coup of 2009"
Using survey data from the Americas Barometer, this paper examines the political attitudes of Honduran citizens before and after the political crisis of 2009, which resulted in the overthrow and expulsion of President Zelaya. I analyze whether Hondurans with family ties in the United States hold stronger democratic attitudes than the rest of the population, and if those attitudes persisted after the coup. There is evidence for the pro-democratic effects of migration prior to the coup. Surprisingly, I find that Hondurans with family ties to the United States are more tolerant of coups and pessimistic about democracy after the political crisis. The change in attitudes is largely driven by those who are financially dependent on remittances as opposed to those who hold frequent communication with relatives abroad.
